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intermediate values of the price-performance sensitivity, our results show the well-
known relationships in the literature between technological regimes and industry
transformation, we find surprising outcomes when demand is strongly biased either
towards price or performance. Hence, for different technological regimes, a high per-
formance sensitivity of demand tends to concentrate the market. On the other hand,
under conditions of high price sensitivity, the industry generally tends to atomize.
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in the analysis of industrial dynamics.
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1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, the realm of industrial dynamics has progressed signif-
icantly (Malerba 2007). One of the most active lines of research has tried to find
causal links between technological regimes and the dynamics of innovative industries
(Nelson and Winter 1982; Dosi 1988; Malerba and Orsenigo 1993, 1996; Marsili
2001). This body of works has drawn upon the fact that technological learning in
different industrial activities differs in the following factors:
(i) The level of technological opportunities. It is a well-known fact that differ-
ent activities and sectors enjoy a different scope and ease for technological
progress.
(ii) The degree of cumulativeness in the production of new knowledge. This aspect
defines to what extent technical solutions are incrementally built upon those
already achieved by a firm.
(iii) The appropriability conditions. That is, the factors which determine the
ease with which innovation results are protected against competitors. Marsili
(1999, 2001) sharpens the notion of appropriability by drawing upon previ-
ous contributions by Pavitt et al. (1989). Thus, Marsili distinguishes between
two types of appropriability mechanisms: firstly, those factors that preserve
innovators from being imitated by competitors from inside and outside the
industry (patents, secrecy, tacitness); secondly, those technological character-
istics which make it difficult for external firms to enter the sector. We may
refer to the former appropriability conditions as barriers to imitation, and to
the latter as technological entry barriers or barriers for innovative entry.
The aforementioned aspects define different types of technological regimes.
From a formal-theoretical perspective, Winter (1984) proposed, in his classical
paper on technological regimes and industrial dynamics, that the entrepreneurial
vs routinized mode of innovation in an industry—i.e. the specific character of the
technological regime—could determine the evolution pattern of the industry in very
specific ways. These relationships have also been explored theoretically and empir-
ically by Dosi et al. (1995), and Breschi et al. (2000). Both the theoretical and
the empirical contributions point to certain relationships between entrepreneurial
regimes (open and permeable techno-institutional conditions favoring the emergence
of new agents) and patterns of industry evolution akin to creative destruction (char-
acterized by a high number of firms, a low industry concentration and a key role
played by new entrants vs incumbent innovators). On the other hand, it has been
suggested that routinized regimes (those showing techno-institutional conditions
favoring incumbent innovators) could lead to creative accumulation patterns (char-
acterized by higher concentration levels, a lower number of firms and consolidated
incumbents leading innovation).
Undoubtedly, the literature on technological regimes and sectoral dynamics has
shed new light on the reasons for the uneven evolution of industrial activities in mod-
ern economies. Nevertheless, recent contributions by Malerba (2006), Klepper and
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Malerba (2010), Bresnahan and Yin (2010) or Dosi and Nelson (2010) suggest that,
although we have achieved significant advances along these lines, it may be time to
explore the interplay between knowledge-related aspects of innovation and demand-
driven mechanisms of market competition. To this regard, in this paper we propose
an evolutionary model of industrial dynamics to analyze market concentration and
leadership shifts in different technological regimes and demand conditions.
Our model lies in the tradition of Nelson and Winter (1982)—see also
Metcalfe (1998), Dosi (2001) or Silverberg and Verspagen (2005)—and it incorpo-
rates entry/exit mechanisms, innovation, imitation, competition, strategic learning
and firm growth in an innovative industry. We assume that price-setting (for-profit)
firms compete in questions of price and product performance. They improve their
products through R&D-based innovation activities, and they do so both by carry-
ing out inner activities of knowledge creation, and by imitating their competitors to
assimilate their existing knowledge. Firms also update their R&D investment routines
through a learning mechanism with a stochastic component. An important feature of
our model is that we conceive global demand transformation as a gradual process
driven by users/consumers’ learning and by firms’ competitiveness (in price and per-
formance). Thus, the process of demand transformation indicates the rhythm of the
output and capacity growth of firms.
It is worth pointing out that our model’s analysis incorporates the notion of a
technological regime to characterize different learning and innovation conditions
in different sectors. The level of technological opportunities, cumulativeness, and
appropriability conditions—in the form of both barriers to imitation and barriers
to innovative entry (Marsili 1999)—appear in the model. On the demand side, the
price-performance sensitivity of demand plays a key role in the model. This factor is
explicitly mentioned by Klepper and Malerba (2010; p. 1516) and, drawing upon the
taxonomical study of Keith Pavitt, by Dosi and Nelson (2010; p. 87). In fact, these
authors distinguish between sectors whose demand is price-sensitive (agrofood, con-
sumer durables), performance-sensitive (medical instruments, industrial machinery),
or mixed (electronics or chemicals).
As we will see, the computational analysis of the model shows that market demand
plays a key role in industrial dynamics. Thus, although for intermediate values of
the price-performance sensitivity of demand our results reproduce well-known rela-
tionships in the literature—entrepreneurial vs. routinized regimes leading to creative
destruction vs. creative accumulation—, we find surprising outcomes when demand
is strongly biased either towards price or performance. Hence, for very different tech-
nological regimes, a high performance sensitivity of demand tends to concentrate the
market. On the contrary, under conditions of high price sensitivity, the industry tends
to atomize. Therefore, our model seems to indicate that the well-known relation-
ships between industrial dynamics and technological regimes (found in the literature)
might only emerge under certain demand conditions.
Our paper is organized as follows: we present our model in Section 2. In Section 3,
we offer a general overview of the model feedbacks and theoretical mechanisms. In
Section 4, we focus on the computational analysis of the model to clarify the role of
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demand in alternative technological regimes. Here we find that the well-known rela-
tionships between technological regimes and industrial dynamics only emerge under
certain demand conditions in the model. Finally, we summarize our conclusions.
2 The model
2.1 The competitiveness of firms
Let us assume that there are n(i = 1, . . . , n) firms competing in an innovative indus-
try with price1 pit and product performance xit (quality, reliability, size, speed,
precision). Regarding prices, we will assume that firms set prices by applying a mark-
up over their unit cost (the greater their market power, the higher the mark-up). With
m(sit ) being a function including the mark-up set by each firm depending on its
market share2 and cit the total cost per output unit, we suppose that:
pit = m(sit )cit , m(sit ) ≥ 1, m(0) = 1, m′ > 0
For simplicity, we will consider the following pricing routine (Almudi et al. 2012;
Fatas-Villafranca and Saura 2004):
pit = (1 + sit )cit , (1)
From Eq. 1, it is straightforward that firm i’s unit profit is
πit = sit cit (2)
Regarding performance (xit ), we will establish, later, how firms improve their
products through R&D-based technological innovations. For now, given the vec-
tor (pit , xit ), we define the level of competitiveness of firm i (as perceived by the
consumers/users in the market) as follows:
γit = (1 − α)xit − xt
xt
− αpit − pt
pt
, α ∈ (0, 1)
xt = xjt
n
; pt =
pjt
n
(3)
Parameter α represents the price-performance sensitivity of demand. In Eq. 3 we
assume that any firm i is more competitive in the market, the better its product per-
formance, and the lower its price. In addition, let us note that competitiveness in price
(and performance) is measured in relation to the average price (and performance) in
the market.
1We use physical capital as numerary.
2See Ariga et al. (1999) for interesting empirical evidence on market shares as determinants of firms’
mark-ups.
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2.2 Demand transformation and production
There is demand-driven production and firm growth in our model. Regarding the
demand-side of the market, we shall consider that the total market demand (Qdt ) is
constant. For simplicity we normalize it with a value of 1. That is:3
Qdt = Q = 1
Likewise, with sit being the proportion of global demand supplying firm i at moment
t—that is, its market share—we see that the instantaneous demand of firm i will be:
Qdit = sitQ = sit (4)
That is to say, the demand of firm i coincides with its market share. If we now con-
sider that the consumers/users interact with and observe each other, and spread and
share information regarding the prices and performances of the different products, we
can suppose that there is a gradual process of demand transformation. Consumers will
retire their demand from certain firms and give it to those with a higher level of γit
In a recent paper, Fatas-Villafranca et al. (2011) propose explicit evolutionary micro-
foundations to capture this kind of processes, and obtain a typical replicator dynamics
expression. Along these lines, and drawing also on Metcalfe (1998), we propose that
the process of demand transformation in the model can be represented as:
gdit ≡
Qdit+1 − Qdit
Qdit
= sit+1 − sit
sit
= γit − γ t , i = 1, . . . , n
with γ t =
n∑
j=1
sjt γjt . (5)
Equation 5 establishes that those firms with competitiveness levels higher than the
(share-weighted) average levels will experience positive demand growth rates, and
increase their market share.
Additionally, we assume that each firm’s rate of growth fits the growth rate of its
demand given by Eq. 5. Therefore, if we suppose that all firms produce in accordance
with a technology:
Qsit = Kit
and assuming that Qit = Qsit = Qdit ,∀t , the following must be fulfilled:
git ≡ Qit+1 − Qit
Qit
= gsit = gkit ≡
Kit+1 − Kit
Kit
= gdit =
sit+1 − sit
sit
(6)
3We make this simplifying assumption to focus on the analysis of the market competitive process. In
Almudi et al. (2012) we consider growth and analyze its effects on industrial dynamics.
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From the above-mentioned it is clear that:4
Q =
n∑
j=1
Qsjt =
n∑
j=1
Kjt = K = 1
2.3 R&D spending
We shall suppose that in each time period, firms will spend on R&D a proportion
rit ∈ [0, 1] of the profits obtained in the previous time period. Therefore, firm i’s
R&D spending at any time will be:
Rit+1 = ritπitQit (7)
Clearly, rit is a firm-specific operating routine. According to Silverberg and Verspagen
(2005), deciding the most convenient level of rit has traditionally been considered to
be a highly uncertain strategic choice. Therefore, instead of assuming that rit is cal-
culated by applying any optimizing procedure, we will consider that firms adapt this
routine by trying to imitate the behavior of their most successful rival in a percentage
β. We assume that there is a random component (εit ) introducing a certain lack of
precision in the perception of the target to imitate. More precisely, we will consider
that firms update rit according to the following expression:5
rit+1 = rit + β
(〈
r∗t + εit
〉 − rit
)
, β ∈ [0, 1] , εit ∼ N(0, σ ) (8)
We denote by r∗t the R&D routine of the most profitable firm at any time (r∗t =
rarg Maxi {πit },t ), and β is a learning parameter. Let us note that parameter β somehow
determines a higher or lower strategic stability of the firms in the sector. Parameter σ
can be interpreted as both an indicator of strategic/informational fuzziness—as firms
will be visualising target r∗t less precisely, the higher the value of σ—, as well as
in terms of volatility, given that the most profitable firm will alter its behavior more
abruptly, the higher the value of σ . Highly innovative industries are affected by high
levels of uncertainty. This justifies that even the most profitable firm at any given
time can consider changing their behavior, modifying r∗t .
Finally, firm i’s unit cost will be:
cit = 1 + Rit
Qit
= 1 + rit−1πit−1 Qit−1
Qit
(9)
4That is, there is a constant stock of physical capital K = 1, and we suppose that firms hire the capital they
need to satisfy demand at any given moment. So, if a firm gains market share, it will hire additional units of
capital, but if it loses share, it will stop hiring those units it no longer needs. Moreover, as Q = Qjt and
K = Kjt , it is clear that, sit ≡ QitQ = KitK . Likewise, since Q = K = 1, it follows that sit = Qit = Kit .
5Where,
〈r〉 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 r < 0
r 0 ≤ r ≤ 1
1 1 < r
⎫
⎬
⎭
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2.4 Product innovation
Expression 10 below is, basically, an innovation equation inspired in Nelson (1982),
where Rit is the spending on R&D and zit is R&D productivity.
xit+1 − xit = zit xηitRit (10)
Where
zit = φ
(
xMaxt −xit
xit
)
+ uit , uit ∼  (umin, umode, uMax)
φ ∈ [0, 1]; umin = umode = 0; uMax ∈ [0, 1]
η ∈ [0, 1]
The expression  (umin, umode, uMax) is the density function of a triangular prob-
ability distribution. It is clear that parameter uMax is an indicator of the level of
technological opportunities in the industry. The greater this parameter, the higher
the probability that the R&D productivity of any firm will show large and positive
shocks.
In Eq. 10, we are assuming that the productivity of R&D depends on the acqui-
sition of new knowledge which comes from two complementary sources: inner
research activities—with a firm-idiosyncratic innovative output captured by uit in
Eq. 10—and, imitation, through which firms assimilate existing knowledge already
produced by their competitors in the industry. This element is captured by the gap-
expression in Eq. 10. It is straightforward to interpret the parametric value of φ as
an indicator of the higher or lower appropriability of new knowledge in the industry.
More precisely, through this parameter we capture the barriers to imitation in the
sense of Marsili (1999). So, the higher the value of φ, the lower the barriers to imi-
tation, and low values of φ will correspond to high imitation barriers in the industry
(secrecy, tacitness, patents).
Finally, let us mention that parameter η captures the degree of cognitive cumu-
lativeness in the industry (Rosenberg 1976). In fact, Eq. 10 incorporates two
mechanisms that may be associated with cumulativeness:
Firstly, the factor xηit . Clearly, the higher the value of parameter η is, the more the
technical solutions to innovative problems are incrementally built upon knowledge
already achieved by the firm (this previous knowledge is enclosed in xit ). Following
Rosenberg (1976), we believe that this self-reinforcing aspect of cognitive processes
is very important. In fact, we will assume high cognitive cumulativeness (η = 1) as an
almost permanent assumption in our model.6 To this regard, we draw upon previous
contributions by Romer (1990) or, in the evolutionary tradition, Fatas-Villafranca
et al. (2009).
6We are grateful for the referees’ comments regarding cumulativeness in Eq. 10. Although we shall con-
centrate on the case of high cumulativeness, an exhaustive exploration of the role of η ∈ [0, 1] opens up
lines for future research. To illustrate this point, we will explore some aspects of our model related to low
cumulativeness in Section 4.1.2 and in the Appendix 2.
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Secondly, the factor Rit introduces in Eq. 10 a success-breeds-success mechanism
coming from the way in which R&D activities are funded in the model.7 The sig-
nificance of this mechanism has been highlighted by Malerba and Orsenigo (1993,
1996.
2.5 Exit and entry of firms
Any firm i whose capital Kit falls below a minimum quantity8 exits the market. On
the other hand, new firms can enter the market. At every time step, we assume that
there is a certain probability that, at the most, one new firm enters the sector.9 Like-
wise, we assume that such a probability is higher, the greater the maximum profit is in
the sector. To be specific, we consider that the probability of this event occurring is:
P(Et = 1) = (1 − λ)π
Max
t
1 + πMaxt
with λ ∈ [0, 1]. (11)
where Et is a random variable that represents the number of new entrants (either 0
or 1) at time t , and πMaxt represents the maximum profit achieved by a firm at t . It is
worth noting that parameter λ can be interpreted as an indicator of the entry barriers
in the industry. Although the notion of entry barriers is rather general, we will con-
sider here interpretations of this parameter from a knowledge-based approach. In this
regard, parameter λ may include the so-called technological entry barriers (Marsili
2001). Let us recall that high technological entry barriers in a sector can arise from
the new entrants’ need to manage different fields of knowledge (Winter 1987).
Additionally, the need to combine technological capabilities and complementary
assets to gain access to certain sectors may also reinforce the barriers to innovative
entry (Teece 1986). In any case, regarding our model, the higher the value of λ, the
stronger the entry barriers in the industry.
Additionally, we suppose that the new entrant will have an initial capital given by:
Kn+1 ∼ U(0,KmaxEntry) (12)
Where KmaxEntry is an exogenous parameter, and U denotes the continuous uniform
probability distribution. Let us note that, after assigning the initial capital to the new
entrant, all capitals are normalized, so they all add up to one. Thus, at all times, any
firm’s capital is equal to its market share.
Finally, we assume that the new entrant randomly chooses one of the existing
incumbent firms to replicate its level of performance, and its R&D to profits ratio.
7Another extension of our model would involve introducing a parameter in Eq. 10 to control the impact
of the success-breeds-success mechanism in R&D funding. We are also grateful to the referees for this
suggestion. We shall leave this extension for future research, since it implies reflecting on the R&D to size
relationship, or the possible existence of diminishing returns to R&D. See Klepper (1996) or Cohen and
Klepper (1996).
8The minimum capital in our computational experiments is 10−6.
9Every time a firm enters or exits the market, the sum of all capitals is normalized to 1.
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We shall suppose that the probability of an incumbent being selected for replication
is proportional to its market share.
3 Overview of the dynamics
Before looking at the computational analysis, we shall briefly consider the feed-
backs and theoretical mechanisms of the model. Figure 1 schematically represents
the dynamics of the model. The variables that are more closely related to costs and
prices are placed on the left, whilst the variables more closely related to the processes
of innovation and performance improvement appear towards the right.
Firstly, we notice that the dynamics of the model are characterized by the trajecto-
ries of the fundamental variables sit , rit , xit . From these fundamental trajectories we
can obtain the trajectories of the other variables. Figure 1 shows positive feedbacks
in black and negative ones in grey. The dashed lines represent the variables affected
after a delay.
As we know, firms compete on prices and product performance. Both factors make
up a firm’s competitiveness. The greater this is, the greater a firm’s growth in terms of
Fig. 1 Overview of the interactions between the variables in the model. A solid black arrow from X to
Y denotes that an increment in variable X implies an immediate increment in variable Y. A dashed black
arrow implies that the positive influence is not immediate, but is delayed by one time step. A solid grey
arrow from X to Y denotes an immediate negative influence, i.e. that an increment in variable X implies
an immediate decrement in variable Y
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market share. Therefore, its profits and R&D investment will also increase. This will
allow it to improve its product performance at a greater speed. Besides this, as firms
gain more market share, they will also set higher prices which, in turn, will make
them lose competitiveness and growth capacity. Likewise, an increase in spending on
R&D increases unit costs which will also increase their prices and reduce competi-
tiveness and, consequently, their capacity to grow. Furthermore, as a firm improves
its performance, it will tend to approach the maximum performance level at any given
time, and so the possibilities of improvement here may also be reduced. The lower
part of Fig. 1 shows the mechanism for strategic learning, with which firms determine
the higher or lower intensity of their R&D investment.
Finally, the mechanism of a firm’s entry introduces new issues into the scheme
in Fig. 1. New innovative entrants appear on the scene contributing to reshape the
sectorial structure. The probability of these entrants appearing is higher, the greater
the maximum profit rate; and lower, the higher the entry barriers.
Let us note that, in this scheme, there are six parameters playing a central role, i.e.:
the price-performance sensitivity of demand α; the two parameters of R&D strategic
updating β, σ ; parameter uMax giving the level of technological opportunities in the
sector; parameter φ which offers an idea of the barriers to imitation; and parameter
λ which captures the entry barriers in the industry.10
It is worth noting that much of the heterogeneity and dynamic richness of this
model comes from its stochastic components. To illustrate this point, let us focus on
the deterministic version of the model, where uMax = σ = 0 and λ = 1. It can be
proved (see Appendix 1) that the only stationary11 situations in such a deterministic
model are those where all firms present in the market become indistinguishable from
each other. This does not mean that all firms in a model run will necessarily converge
to the same characteristics; some of them may perish on the way. What it means is
that a necessary (and sufficient) condition for stationarity is that all surviving firms
end up sharing the market equally, by selling an identical product (i.e. with the same
performance) at exactly the same price.
Such a deterministic and familiar state of affairs contrasts with the results obtained
when stochastic innovation is possible and new firms can enter the market. In such
a case, the market never settles: firms enter and exit the market, and small firms can
make dramatic innovations that allow them to rise above their competitors. Under
certain conditions, these innovative firms may even challenge the market leader, and
make it fall. Depending on various factors, leaderships may last for only a few time
periods, or they may continue for a long time; the market may be dominated by
only a few consolidated firms, or it may be shared among many small firms. In such
stochastic settings, even though there is a constant turnover of firms, neat dynamic
patterns emerge, which have clearly defined properties that depend on the particular
parameterisation of the model.
10Let us point out the importance of differentiating between barriers to imitation and technical entry bar-
riers. Thus, (e.g.) in the aircraft-engine industry we find high technical entry barriers, together with low
barriers to imitation (Marsili 1999).
11Our concept of stationarity implies that sit = sit+1 and rit = rit+1, for all i = 1, . . . , n and for all t .
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Table 1 Parametric values for
computational analysis α 0.1 0.5 0.9
λ 0.1 0.5 0.9
uMax 0.1 0.5 0.9
φ 0.1 0.5 0.9
β 0.1 0.5 0.9
σ 0.1 0.3
Due to the complexity and stochastic nature of the model, we cannot offer closed-
form solutions for the properties of the observed dynamic patterns, but we can
approximate them with confidence and rigour using extensive computer simulations.
All the simulation runs reported in this paper can be replicated using the applet
provided in the supplementary material (see http://luis.izqui.org/models/indyterrod/).
In Table 1, we present the parametric values we will combine.12
Thus, we explore 486 different parametric settings. Parameter KmaxEntry turned
out not to be particularly significant within a sensitive range, so we fixed its value
at 0.05. For each combination of the parameter values shown in Table 1, we ran
1,000 simulations until time step 30,000, and compiled various statistics (such as the
Herfindhal index and the number of firms) at the end of each simulation run. Thus, the
analysis presented below summarises a total of 486,000 simulation runs. Naturally,
our hope is that the sample distributions of the statistics observed at time 30,000 are
representative of the general dynamics of the model for each parameter setting. To
make sure this is the case, we compared the sample distributions observed at time
30,000 with those observed at time 20,000. In all cases, the difference between these
two sample distributions was not significant in the context of our study, so we are
reasonably confident that all the values reported in this paper are representative of
the general dynamics of the system.
As for initial conditions, the initial number of firms n0 and the initial performance
level x0 were both set to a value of one; and the initial ratio of R&D over profits was
r0 = 0.3. We are confident that the effect of these initial conditions on the results
reported in this paper is minimal, since the distributions of each of these variables
(nt , rt and xt ) at times 20,000 and 30,000 were similar, and different from the initial
conditions, for all parameterisations.13
In this way, we obtain simulation outputs in the form of series of relevant variables
for the analysis of the structure and evolution of our modelled industry (i.e. number
of firms; index of industrial concentration; entry/exit pattern; etc). In the next Section
we present the results obtained through simulations.
12Let us remember that throughout our work, in general, we will suppose high cumulativeness in Eq. 10,
that is, η = 1.
13All our simulation results can be replicated using the applet provided at: http://luis.izqui.org/models/
indyterrod. By running this applet, the reader can easily check that the stationary distributions we report
in this paper emerge regardless of the initial conditions. That is, neat patterns for the limiting distributions
emerge, which depend on the specific parametric settings, but not on the departure point.
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4 Industry dynamics, demand and technological regimes
The analysis of our results shows the special relevance of parameter α (the price-
performance sensitivity of demand) for the dynamics and structure of the sector. As
we will analyze in the following two sections (Sections 4.1 and 4.2), we can state
that, although with demand conditions where consumers value price and performance
similarly (α = 0.5), the model reproduces the expected relationships between techno-
logical regimes and patterns of industry transformation (see Table 2 and Section 4.1),
it can be affirmed that, as a general property of the model, these relationships are
strongly conditioned by the demand profile (see Figs. 8 and 9). Hence, in different
technological regimes, a high performance sensitivity of demand (α = 0.1) tends to
concentrate the market, whilst high values of α (α = 0.9; i.e. high price sensitivity of
demand) fragment the market (see Section 4.2).
Consequently, we can find that, for example, drawing on the classical Winter
(1984) distinction between entrepreneurial vs routinized regimes, in an
entrepreneurial regime (see Table 2 for specification), if the demand is very sensitive
to performance, the pattern of creative destruction fades, with certain features of
creative accumulation appearing (e.g. high market concentration). In the same way,
in a routinized regime, if the price sensitivity of the demand is high, certain features
of creative accumulation disappear and new patterns—more typical of creative
destruction- emerge.
In the next two sections, we analyze in detail the role of demand in industrial
dynamics. We first focus on intermediate demand profiles (α = 0.5; Section 4.1)
and afterwards we explore the case of extreme values for the price-performance
sensitivity of demand (α = 0.1; α = 0.9; Section 4.2).
4.1 Intermediate values for the price-performance sensitivity of demand
Let us consider that the price-performance sensitivity of demand adopts an interme-
diate value (i.e. α = 0.5). Given this value of α, we will analyze the relationships
between distinct parametric configurations—characterizing alternative technological
regimes—and alternative patterns of industrial transformation. In accordance with the
Table 2 Technological regimes and industry evolution
Technological regime (setting) Pattern of industry evolution
Routinized Creative accumulation
High/Low technological opportunities Few firms
High entry barriers High market concentration
High appropriability (e.g. Computer Mainframes) Low entry rate
Entrepreneurial Creative destruction
High/Low technological opportunities Many firms
Low entry barriers Low market concentration
Low appropriability (e.g. Biotechnology) High entry rate
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definition of technological regime, we characterize the different regimes in terms of
three parameters: uMax (level of technological opportunities), λ (entry barriers) and
φ (barriers to imitation). We will assume—as an almost permanent assumption- high
cumulativeness in Eq. 9, that is, η = 1. Relaxing this assumption leaves extensions
for future research (see Appendix 2).
Now, let us recall that, traditionally, we have seen two different basic types of
technological regimes in the literature (see Winter 1984): the entrepreneurial regime,
leading to creative destruction patterns of industry evolution; and the routinized
regime, which generates creative accumulation dynamics. In Table 2, we summarize
the characteristic features of these two basic types.
Observing Table 2, it is interesting to test whether our model can reproduce the
habitual relationships with intermediate demand conditions (α = 0.5). We shall see
that this is indeed the case.
4.1.1 Routinized technological regime
As indicated by Winter (1984), a routinized regime is one that favours innovation by
established firms. Thus, we set up a parametric scenario which represents the diffi-
culty to enter into the sector due to high entry barriers. In addition, here knowledge
is hardly shared internally (strong appropriability conditions). We reproduce these
conditions in our model by making λ = 0.9, φ = 0.1.
Regarding the level of technological opportunities, we shall begin with an interme-
diate level. Later on, we shall vary the value of uMax and confirm that the higher the
level of technological opportunities, the clearer the differences between the dynamics
emerging from routinized vs entrepreneurial regimes are. Finally, we point out that
the assumption of high cumulativeness (η = 1) strengthens the routinized character
of the regime we will simulate.
Thus, as our starting point, the parametric scenario for our simulations corre-
sponds to:
α = 0.5; λ = 0.9;φ = 0.1; uMax = 0.5;β = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9} ; σ = {0.1, 0.3}.
The values of the Herfindhal index and the number of firms at t = 30,000, obtained
for the different parametric configurations of the routinized regime, appear in Fig. 2.
Creative accumulation In these conditions, the emergent structure of the sector is
highly concentrated (average Herfindhal Index around 0.72) and tends to stabilize
around a small number of firms (about 4). These features are peculiar to a creative
accumulation pattern (see Table 2).
If we explore the processes underlying the emergence of the results in Fig. 2, we
can see14 that the evolution in the sector can be described as a succession of eras of
firms, each one with a structure of the “oligopoly with a dominant firm” kind; and
the dominant firm changes with time.
14These processes can be reproduced by using the applet: http://luis.izqui.org/models/indyterrod.
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Fig. 2 Box-plots of the Herfindhal index (above) and the number of firms (below) at time step 30,000,
for α = 0.5, λ = 0.9, φ = 0.1, uMax = 0.5, and different values of σ and β. Each box-plot represents data
from 1,000 simulation runs
In these processes (typical of creative accumulation), for long periods of time, a
firm which survives much longer than the others will become market leader with a
high market share (the average market share of the leader is greater than 0.8 (s.d.
<0.003)); it is also leader in product performance (the average relative performance
of the leader (xleader
/
xMax) is greater than 0.998 (s.d. <0.001)). During each era, the
corresponding leader is continually challenged by new entrants which survive for a
while. On average, each dominant firm co-exists alongside 3 or 4 smaller ones (see
Fig. 2).
Clearly, the leaders enjoy certain competitive advantages. One such advantage
is a greater market share, which allows them to invest more in R&D—Eq. 7—and
develop their products more quickly. The advantage in performance has two posi-
tive effects: firstly, it creates a favorable situation for the leader to capture market
share—Eq. 5; in addition, it reinforces the accumulative innovation process—Eq. 10.
Regarding prices, the greater mark-up applied by the leader increases its price (Eqs. 1
and 9). Leadership will be maintained while the combination of performance and
prices offers sufficient competitiveness to the leader—Eq. 3.
It is worth pointing out that being the leader has its drawbacks. A highly con-
centrated market generates a high maximum profit rate, which attracts new potential
entrants (Eqs. 2 and 11). The visibility (high market share) of the leader causes
many of the entrants to copy its performance. Although most of these entrants do not
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manage to maintain their relative performance, entrants occasionally appear with
such a combination of price and performance that they can stay in the market. Some-
times, but not often, some of these entrants may overtake the leader and start a new
era. In Fig. 3, we show the number of leadership shifts during a certain simulation
interval (for 10,000 periods of time).
According to Fig. 3, when β is low, the era shifts are much less common. Addition-
ally, we will see later that the number of leadership shifts is lower in the routinized
regime than in the entrepreneurial regime. Once again, this result is expected in a
creative accumulation pattern of change.
We show in Fig. 4 how the results change when modifying the level of technolog-
ical opportunities:
Figure 4 shows that the higher the level of technological opportunities, the higher
the degree of concentration in the sector tends to be. The effects of uMax indicate
that, under conditions of a routinized regime, a high level of technological opportuni-
ties reinforces the pattern of creative accumulation. Likewise, as we shall see below,
it is interesting to compare Figs. 4 and 7 (below); this comparison shows that the
higher the value of uMax, the clearer the difference between the concentration levels
emerging from routinized versus entrepreneurial regimes.
To summarize, we can state that under the conditions typical of routinized
regimes, and considering an intermediate value of the price-performance sensitiv-
ity of demand, we have found the expected patterns of creative accumulation. This
emphasizes the plausibility of our model.
4.1.2 Entrepreneurial technological regime
Entrepreneurial regimes are characterized by open and permeable learning condi-
tions favouring the emergence of new innovative firms. Therefore, now, we set up a
parametric scenario in which it is easy to enter because of the low entry barriers, and
knowledge is spread easily (weak appropriability conditions). Likewise, the level of
Fig. 3 Box-plots of the number of leadership shifts between time step 20,001 and time step 30,000, for
α = 0.5, λ = 0.9, φ = 0.1, uMax = 0.5, and different values of σ and β. Each box-plot represents data
from 1,000 simulation runs
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Fig. 4 Box-plots of the Herfindhal index at time step 30,000 for α = 0.5, λ = 0.9, φ = 0.1 and different
values of uMax. Each box-plot represents data from 6,000 simulation runs (1,000 runs for each combination
of values of β = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9} and σ = {0.1, 0.3})
technological opportunities can be wider or narrower. As we will see, under condi-
tions of high technological opportunities, the levels of market concentration emerging
from this regime will differ in a stronger way from the ones in the routinized regime.
In addition, although for coherence and due to the space limitations, we run the model
in high cumulativeness conditions (η = 1), we present in Appendix 2 the results for
entrepreneurial regimes with low cumulativeness (η = 0.1).15
We shall start by considering the parametric scenario for our simulations:
α = 0.5; λ = 0.1;φ = 0.9; uMax = 0.5;β = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}; σ = {0.1, 0.3}
The values of the Herfindhal index and the number of firms at t = 30,000, obtained
for different parametric configurations of the entrepreneurial regime, appear in Fig. 5.
Creative destruction Under these conditions the emergent structure of the sector is
not concentrated (average Herfindhal Index around 0.1) and tends to stabilize around
a large number of firms. These features are representative of a creative destruction
pattern (see Table 2).
The industrial dynamics16 can also be described as a succession of eras of firms,
each one with a “dominant firm” structure, where the dominant firm can change over
time. However, in contrast to the routinized regime, the structure of the sector is not
concentrated, and so the leader has a market share only slightly higher than that of
the others. The average market share of the leader is below 0.2 (s.d. <0.001), whilst
its average relative performance (xleader
/
xMax) is greater than 0.999 (s.d. <0.0001)).
Owing to the high level of openness in the sector, the leader is continually threat-
ened by new entrants—many more than those in the routinized regime. These new
15The results of Appendix 2 show that, regarding low cumulativeness, the creative destruction character
holds perfectly in the dynamics. With a provisional rough approximation, we can see that the cumulative-
ness parameter does not seem to have an excessive effect on the limit results in this case (see Appendix 2
and Fig. 5). However, future research should offer an exhaustive analysis of the role of cumulativeness in
the model.
16See applet in: http://luis.izqui.org/models/indyterrod.
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Fig. 5 Box-plots of the Herfindhal index (above) and the number of firms (below) at time step 30,000,
for α = 0.5, λ = 0.1, φ = 0.9, uMax = 0.5, and different values of σ and β. Each box-plot represents data
from 1,000 simulation runs
entrants reach a performance relatively close to that of the leader, and fix lower prices
owing to their smaller size. The combination of both factors explains that, in the
entrepreneurial regime, the leader loses a lot of market share to the new entrants.
The relatively homogeneous character of market shares in this regime, together
with low entry barriers and the low appropriability of innovations, generate a pattern
of industry evolution which is more turbulent than that observed in routinized condi-
tions. Hence, many firms enter, challenge and imitate each other with relative ease,
while knowledge is widely spread and shared, homogenizing performances.
All these effects are reflected in the fact that, in the entrepreneurial regime, the
number of leadership shifts is higher than in the routinized regime (compare Figs. 3
and 6). It is also interesting to see that high values of both, β and σ , increase the
number of leadership shifts (see Fig. 6).
We shall now analyze how the results are altered when the level of technological
opportunities is modified (uMax = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}) .
From Fig. 7, when opportunities are limited (uMax = 0.1), the sector becomes
very fragmented and significantly dispersed. On the other hand, when the level of
technological opportunities in the sector is high uMax = 0.9, the concentration in the
sector tends to increase, but never reaches high levels of industrial concentration.
It is noteworthy that, in a context of high technological opportunities (high value
of uMax), the differences in market concentration between the entrepreneurial regime
I. Almudi et al.
Fig. 6 Box-plots of the number of leadership shifts between time step 20,001 and time step 30,000, for
α = 0.5, λ = 0.1, φ = 0.9, uMax = 0.5, and different values of σ and β. Each box-plot represents data
from 1,000 simulation runs
and the routinized regime are much clearer (compare Fig. 7 with Fig. 4). Thus, as
uMax grows, the differences (in terms of the Herfindhal index) between the indus-
try structures emerging from the routinized vs entrepreneurial conditions become
greater.
To sum up, we can state that our model generates the standard results in the liter-
ature when the price-performance sensitivity of demand takes its intermediate level.
We obtained creative accumulation patterns emerging from routinized regimes, and
creative destruction emerging from the entrepreneurial regimes. Nevertheless, as we
will see in Section 4.2, the standard results seem to fade under biased demand pro-
files, with new results appearing. Therefore, we could affirm that the well-known
results in the literature only emerge under certain demand conditions in our model.
To see this, we study the case of α = 0.1 y α = 0.9 in Section 4.2.
Fig. 7 Box-plots of the Herfindhal index at time step 30,000 for α = 0.5, λ = 0.1, φ = 0.9 and different
values of uMax. Each box-plot represents data from 6,000 simulation runs (1,000 runs for each combination
of values of β = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9} and σ = {0.1, 0.3})
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4.2 Extreme values for the price-performance sensitivity of demand
In this section, we show that the role of demand is crucial in explaining the secto-
rial dynamics. To be specific, we find that if consumers value product performance
highly, α = 0.1, the sector tends to become concentrated; on the contrary, if con-
sumers are highly price-sensitive, α = 0.9, then the sector tends to atomize (see
Figs. 8 and 9). This is so, no matter which technological regime we are in. To be spe-
cific, as can be seen in Figs. 8 and 9, for α = 0.1, the average Herfindhal index for
most parametric configurations is greater than 0.75, and the number of firms is below
10. Likewise, for α = 0.9, the average Herfindhal index for most parametric settings
is close to “0” (almost perfect competition) and, in general, over 70 firms survive.
Taking into account the mechanisms of the model seen in Fig. 1, we shall try to
interpret these results. We begin by asking why a high performance sensitivity of
Fig. 8 Average Herfindhal index at time step 30,000, for different values of α, λ, uMax, and φ (these are
the four parameters that explain the greatest amount of variability in the Herfindhal index (the selection
of the 4 most explanatory parameters (out of the 6 considered) has been carried out comparing the 15
different ANOVA models of 4 parameters and all their interactions. The model including α, λ, uMax, φ and
their interactions was the model with the lowest sum of squared errors. Incidentally, all factors and their
interactions are significant at 0.0001 in this model, but care must be taken when interpreting this result,
since the assumption of normality does not hold here.)). Thus, each bar represents the average Herfindhal
index at time step 30,000 calculated over 6,000 simulation runs (1,000 runs for each combination of values
of β = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9} and σ = {0.1, 0.3}). All standard errors are below 0.005
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Fig. 9 Average number of firms at time step 30,000, for different values of α, λ, uMax, and φ. Thus,
each bar represents the average number of firms at time step 30,000 calculated over 6,000 simulation runs
(1,000 runs for each combination of values of β = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9} and σ = {0.1, 0.3}). All standard errors
are below 1
demand (low α) leads, in most cases, to a high concentration of the sector. To under-
stand this, the extreme case {α = 0.1, λ = 0.9, uMax = 0.9} is particularly useful—see
Figs. 8 and 9—, a parameterization shared by 18,000 simulation runs in our study.
As we can see, the Herfindhal index tends to be very close to 1, with only one sur-
viving firm in most cases. In fact, it can be shown that in the 18,000 simulation runs,
the founding firm of the sector always survives and dominates the market. This is so
because this firm enjoys certain competitive advantages which make it unbeatable in
an environment where demand places a high value on product performance level (i.e.
α = 0.1). Thus, a first advantage is its higher market share (which is 1 in the initial
period), allowing it to invest more in R&D—Eq. 7—and develop its product perfor-
mance more quickly. The advantage in performance has two positive effects: on the
one hand, it enables the leader to capture and maintain a higher market share—Eq. 5;
on the other hand, it reinforces the accumulative process of innovation—Eq. 10—,
which is an advantage due to the high level of technological opportunities (uMax =
0.9). Although other firms enter, attracted by the high profit rate of the sector—
Eq. 11—, they do not manage to seize the leadership position from the founder.
This all happens in the extreme case {α = 0.1, λ = 0.9, uMax = 0.9}. However, it is
a very generalized result. It is worth pointing out that as entry barriers diminish and/or
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the level of technological opportunities is reduced, the advantage of the founding firm
is eroded, and the level of concentration in the sector is reduced (see Figs. 8 and 9).
However, the levels of industrial concentration are, in general, very high—and the
number of firms, low.17
Now, let us look at the effects of considering demand to be extremely sensitive to
price (i.e. α = 0.9). In this case, as seen in Figs. 8 and 9, the dynamics of the sector
lead to a high degree of fragmentation, and the average number of firms is high. In
fact, except for λ = 0.9 and uMax = 0.9, the average Herfindhal index is below 0.1
(and in most cases below 0.05), and the average number of firms is, in general, higher
than 50 (in some cases this figure can be over 300).
Once again, to understand the mechanism underlying these results, we consider
the scheme in Fig. 1 again and focus on the extreme case {α = 0.9, λ = 0.1, uMax =
0.1}. Both Figs. 8 and 9 show that, for this case, the average Herfindhal index is close
to zero (almost perfect competition) and, on average, over 300 firms survive.
In this scenario, the firm founding the sector quickly finds itself threatened by new
entrants which, with their small size, set low prices and possess a performance level
close to the maximum at that time—Eq. 11. In a context in which consumers are very
sensitive to price, new entrants wear away the market share of the leading firm—
Eq. 3. Likewise, the low level of technological opportunities (uMax = 0.1) favors the
homogenization of the sector—Eq. 10–, and even more so, the lower the barriers to
imitation (high values of φ). The final result is a high degree of fragmentation of
the sector with firms offering products which are more similar, the lower the degree
of appropriability of the sector. Once again, the extreme case helps us to understand
how the model works, but the result of low concentration when demand is highly
price-sensitive is a general one (see Fig. 8).
All the aforementioned, leads us to reflect on the importance of considering
demand aspects in the analysis of industrial dynamics, as previously pointed out by
Malerba (2006) and others. Malerba states that, at least in the Schumpeterian tradi-
tion, demand has been considered a rather marginal aspect, with the supply side being
emphasized instead. Joseph A. Schumpeter himself might have been responsible for
this, given his consideration of users as passive agents in the innovation process. Our
results seem to confirm Malerba’s concerns: once demand moves to the forefront (as
in our model), not only do new results appear but we also find that the known results
can be looked at from a new perspective.
5 Concluding remarks
We were persuaded to begin this work by the almost generalized feeling that,
after three decades of advances in the study of industrial dynamics, it might be
17Although the level of concentration decreases for the case of very low technological opportunities and
very low entry barriers, we should ask ourselves whether it is realistic to consider a sector which innovates
very little in product and where demand is very performance sensitive. This special case is probably the
least relevant one from an empirical point of view.
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time to explore the interplay between the well-studied knowledge-related aspects of
innovation, and certain demand-driven mechanisms underlying market competition.
The increasing number of contributions that have appeared during the last decade,
expressing the need to examine the interactions between innovation and demand,
seem to support this idea. With the aim of contributing to this body of works, we have
proposed an evolutionary model of industrial dynamics capable of analyzing market
transformations and concentration in different demand conditions and in alternative
technological regimes.
The complexity of the subject, together with the variants in formulation and analy-
sis posed by our model, leads us to present our model as a first step in a more general
research strategy which will be extended with time. However, our results already
seem to confirm that demand can play a decisive role in industrial dynamics. From the
computational analysis of our model we have found that, although for intermediate
values of the price-performance sensitivity of demand the well-known relationships
between technological regimes and industry evolution generally hold, this is not the
case when we consider biased demand profiles—whether they be biased towards
price or to performance. Hence, in our model, a high price sensitivity of demand
tends to atomize the industry, no matter the technological regime we are in. Likewise,
when the demand is clearly performance-sensitive, market concentration emerges in
remarkably different technological conditions. This result is undoubtedly worthy of
deeper study at a later date. In fact, we have attempted to formulate as simple a model
as possible, in order for our results to be easily understandable and to show the way
for future generalisations. In this sense, we shall finish our work by laying down lines
of work which, in our opinion, follow on from our fundamental results.
On the one hand, the fact that our results reproduce—under certain conditions—
the expected relationships between certain technological regimes and corresponding
patterns of industrial transformation allows us to be confident about the plausibility
of our model. Hence, as in previous theoretical and empirical contributions (Winter
1984; Breschi et al. 2000), we have found that, for intermediate demand profiles, typi-
cal entrepreneurial settings generate creative destruction patterns of change, while the
alternative routinized configurations engender creative accumulation. On the other
hand, the most interesting lines of future research derive from the fact that, in our
model, somewhat surprisingly, the predictable processes of creative destruction and
creative accumulation fade as the price-performace sensitivity of demand varies. To
be specific, we believe that there are at least three promising lines which would allow
for a deeper look at these results. Hence:
Firstly, a more exhaustive analysis of the roles of cognitive and R&D cumulative-
ness in the model may be enlightening. The formal and computational complexities
linked to this possible extension of our work are beyond the limited scope of a single
paper. However, we have already pointed out how this research could start out from
the generalizations following on from Eq. 10.
Secondly, it would be interesting to explore the robustness of our results, consid-
ering alternative strategic learning routines, and different investment mechanisms.
Once again, the complications involved in this theoretical generalization exceed the
scope of our present work.
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Finally, we would like to point out that advances towards a more general formu-
lation of our model would, perhaps, allow us to check the new results with more
complex classifications of technological regimes. To this regard, the works by Marsili
(1999, 2001) are an excellent departure point.
Appendix 1
Statement In the deterministic version of the model (i.e. uMax = σ = 0 and λ =
1), stationarity (i.e. sit = sit+1 and rit = rit+1, for all i and for all t) implies that
all firms present in the market end up becoming indistinguishable from each other.
Specifically, using n > 1 to denote the number of firms present in the market, in the
long run (i.e. as time goes to infinity):
(a) sit = si = 1/n, ∀i.
(b) rit = ri = r , ∀i.
(c) cit = ci = n /(n − r), ∀i.
(d) pit = pi = (n +1)/(n − r), ∀i.
(e) Rit = Ri = r/(n(n − r)), ∀i.
(f) xit = xi = xMax, ∀i.
(The case where there is only one firm in the market is insignificant).
Proof The proof is conducted in several steps:
1. rit+1 = rit , ∀i, ∀t ⇒ {Eq. 8} ⇒ rit = r , ∀i, ∀t .
2. sit+1 = sit , ∀i, ∀t ⇒ {Eq. 5} ⇒ γit = γ t , ∀i, ∀t .
3. cit = 1 + Ritsit = 1 + rit−1πit−1
sit−1
sit
= 1 + rit−1sit−1cit−1 sit−1sit ={sit = sit−1 = si; rit = r} = 1 + r · si · cit−1
Noting that r · si < 1, we can solve the recursive equation to obtain:
cit =
(
1 − (r · si)t
)
/(1 − r · si) + ci0(r · si)t
Thus, taking limits when t goes to infinity:
lim
t→∞ cit = 1/(1 − r · si) = ci
4. Rit+1 = r · s2i · cit ⇒ limt→∞ Rit = r · s
2
i /(1 − r · si) = Ri .
5. pit = (1 + si)cit ⇒ lim
t→∞ pit = (1 + si)/(1 − r · si) = pi .
Also, note that, for all i, the convergence of prices pit to the corresponding limit pi
is monotonous, and the series |pit − pi | is geometric and monotonously decreasing
(remember that r · si <1):
|pit − pi | = |(1 + si) [ci0 − 1/(1 − r · si)]| (r · si)t
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In simple words, prices stabilize, i.e. for any time h:
|pih+1 − pih| > |pit+1 − pit | ∀t > h.
6. γit = γ t , ∀i, ∀t ⇒ γit = γjt , ∀i, ∀j , ∀t
Therefore:
γit = (1 − α)xit − xt
xt
− αpit − pt
pt
= (1 − α)xjt − xt
xt
− αpjt − pt
pt
= γjt
(1 − α)xit − xjt
xt
= αpit − pjt
pt
xit − xjt = xt α1 − α
pit − pjt
pt
Since xit > 0, ∀i, ∀t , the equation above implies that beyond a certain time T (i.e.
when prices stabilize and there are no changes in the ranking of prices anymore—see
point 5 of the proof) there cannot be changes in the ranking of performances either,
i.e. ∃T such that xiT > xjT ⇒ xit > xjt , ∀t > T . Thus:
∃m, T , such that xmt = xMaxt , ∀t > T . Using Eq. 10, this implies that xMaxt =
xMax, ∀t > T .
Using Eq. 10 again, and noting that lim
t→∞ Rit = r · s
2
i /(1 − r · si) = Ri and
that φ · r · s2i /(1 − r · si) < 1 (since there cannot be changes in the ranking of
performances ∀t > T ), it can be proved that:
lim
t→∞ xit = x
Max
Thus, in the long run: xit = xi = xMax, ∀i. Bearing in mind also that in the long run
γit = γ t , we then obtain pi = p, ∀i. Thus:
pi = (1 + si)/(1 − r · si) = (1 + sj )/(1 − r · sj ) = pj
⇒ {0 < si < 1} ⇒ si = sj = s = 1/n,∀i, j.
Substituting this last result in the equations derived above, we obtain the 6 proposi-
tions (a–f) included in the statement.
Appendix 2
Given the difficulties involved in an exhaustive computational analysis for all
the parameters of the model,18 we have taken high cumulativeness in Eq. 10 as
an almost permanent assumption. However, it seems reasonable to check—even
18Not only for the high number of simulations required for a rigorous analysis of a stochastic model
like ours, but also—and fundamentally—for the difficulties associated to the global treatment of the
information and the extraction of conclusions from our simulations.
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Fig. 10 Box-plots of the Herfindhal index (above) and the number of firms (below) at time step 30,000,
for α = 0.5, λ = 0.1, φ = 0.9, uMax = 0.5, η = 0.1 and different values of σ and β. Each box-plot
represents data from 1,000 simulation runs
if only provisionally—what would happen to the patterns which emerge from
entrepreneurial regimes, if we suppose low cumulativeness.
In Fig. 10 we present the results obtained for the Herfindhal index and the num-
ber of firms at t = 30,000, for the case of entrepreneurial regimes with η = 0.1,
considering the level of technological opportunities is medium, and the demand has
an intermediate profile. This parametric configuration allows us to directly com-
pare Fig. 10 with Fig. 5, and thus see how the results change when considering low
cumulativeness in entrepreneurial regimes.
As we can see in both figures, the expected results are maintained for the case of
low cumulativeness. In this case, we also obtain low levels of industry concentration
and a high number of firms in the limit states. This reinforces the results seen in Sec-
tion 4.1.2 regarding the appearance of creative destruction patterns in entrepreneurial
regimes.
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